Security, consent and accountability
How Bridge is intended to limit data exposure and preserve accountable permissions without giving public access to private implementation details.
Identity and authorization boundaries
Every data access decision begins with a source identity and a person or institution with competent authority. The intended permission record identifies purpose, fields, beneficiary, duration, territory and onward-transfer limits. Authentication establishes who requested access; authorization determines what the requester may do.
A source’s technical accessibility, possession of a copy, or an algorithmic recommendation does not grant a legally valid right to use, resell or invest in the material.
Encryption, transport and key custody
Local October 20 engineering demonstrated synthetic device-signed Ed25519 requests, scoped consent/revocation, HKDF-derived AES-256-GCM encrypted person records and an encrypted ENTITY local loopback. Production still requires real device enrollment, secure external transport, managed key custody/rotation/recovery, independently enforced tenant isolation, lawful platform adapters and security review. The correct design depends on the source system, recipient and legal context.
BTG does not publish keys, live secret values, internal signing routes, unreviewed configuration or detailed attack surfaces. This high-level requirement statement must not be read as proof that a specific provider integration has passed a security audit.
Recordkeeping and evidence
An auditable handoff should identify the actual approving authority, purpose, allowed material, destination, precise time, applicable revocation or expiry and recorded outcome. A signed receipt supports traceability; it does not establish that every downstream copy was deleted or that the recipient complied with an unrelated statute.
Data lifecycle records should be retained or erased according to the actual applicable policy, contract and law. Technical logs require their own privacy and retention controls.
Breach handling, retention and accountability
Organizations need incident classification, responsibility assignments, notification triggers, access suspension, preservation of evidence, remediation, and relevant jurisdiction-specific disclosure rules. Bridge’s public model is to treat these as institutional obligations alongside software controls.
Where a third party lawfully possesses data under an independent obligation, an originating user’s revocation may restrict future processing but cannot guarantee retroactive deletion of past deliverables or mandatory records.
Sensitive and sovereign sources
Health, student, employment, Indigenous and community-controlled information require dedicated authority and safeguard assessments. Collective rights and public-sector restrictions cannot be compressed into an ordinary individual opt-in checkbox.
Before engaging institutional sources, BTG and the source controller must define permitted purposes, technical isolation, audit access, jurisdiction, transparency and applicable agreements. No public page constitutes approval to disclose confidential material.